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Abstract— This paper analyzes score normalization for keystroke 
dynamics authentication systems. Previous studies have shown 
that the performance of behavioral biometric recognition systems 
(e.g. voice and signature) can be largely improved with score 
normalization and target-dependent techniques. The main 
objective of this work is twofold: i) to analyze the effects of 
different thresholding techniques in 4 different keystroke 
dynamics recognition systems for real operational scenarios; and 
ii) to improve the performance of keystroke dynamics on the 
basis of target-dependent score normalization techniques. The 
experiments included in this work are worked out over the 
keystroke pattern of 114 users from two different publicly 
available databases. The experiments show that there is large 
room for improvements in keystroke dynamic systems. The 
results suggest that score normalization techniques can be used to 
improve the performance of keystroke dynamics systems in more 
than 20%. These results encourage researchers to explore this 
research line to further improve the performance of these 
systems in real operational environments. 
Keywords—ink identification, pen verifier, hyperspectral 
analysis,  handwritten document analysis, forensics. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Biometric recognition technologies allow to authenticate 
users based on "something that we are" instead of traditional 
authentication based on "something that we know" such as 
passwords or PINs. The biometric technologies have become 
popular during last years (e.g. Apple Iphone Fingerprint 
sensor) and nowadays they can be considered an important 
player in consumer technology market. The biometric 
recognition technologies can be divided into physical traits 
(face, fingerprint, iris, DNA ...) and behavioral traits 
(signature, voice, gait, keystroking,...). There is no a 
technology which overcomes the rest and depending of the 
application we can opt for several solutions.  
In this context, the keystroke dynamics authentication 
systems have attracted the interest of both researchers and 
industry [1-3]. The keystroke dynamics are proposed to 
improve the security of traditional authentication services 
based on passwords or PIN numbers. In the case of keystroke 
dynamics, the typical approaches based on fixed password 
authentication combine complex passwords and our keystroke 
dynamic biometrics. The password acts as a primary security 
level and the user access is not allowed until the correct 
password is inserted. The role of the biometric system is a 
secondary security level which try to detect intruders who are 
spoofing the identity of the legitimate user.  
Among all the biometric technologies, keystroke dynamic 
recognition is especially interesting for Cyber Security 
because of: i) no need of extra sensors as the recognition of 
users is done according to their typing patterns using a 
keyboard or keypad; ii) it is possible to realize a continuous 
authentication based on the monitoring of the user behavior 
[4]; iii) keystroke dynamic technologies can be easily 
integrated into existing web-platforms or web-services.  
The flowchart of typical keystroke dynamic recognition 
systems includes a classification phase in which query 
samples are compared with a stored template, see Fig.1. The 
identity of the user will be authenticated if the distance 
between the template and the query sample is lower than a 
pre-defined threshold. How to define this threshold is a 
challenge that has to be addressed before the deployment of a 
biometric system in real operational environments and score 
normalization can help to simplify it.  
Score normalization has proved its usefulness for 
improving the performance of behavioral biometric traits such 
as signature [5-8] or voice [9-12]. The normalization of score 
mitigates the effects of misalignment between scores 
distribution from different users (this misalignment is common 
in behavioral traits). For the best of our knowledge, this topic 
has been scarcely analyzed by the research community for 
keystroke dynamics biometric systems. 
This work studies score normalization techniques to 
improve the performance of keystroke authentication systems 
for real environments. Our experiments include four keystroke 
classifiers, three different normalization techniques and two 
publicly available databases. The results suggest that score 
normalization can be used to improve the performance of 
keystroke authentication systems. This work encourages to 
further explore in score normalization techniques for a better 
deployment of keystroke authentication in real-world services. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the main modules of a keystroke authentication 
system and introduces the score normalization techniques 
analyzed; Section 3 presents the experimental framework and 
results; Finally Section 4 draws some conclusions. 
 
II. KEYSTROKE DYNAMIC AUTHENTICATION 
The keystroke authentication systems analyzed in this work 
include the traditional biometric recognition modules, see Fig. 
1. The main modules are described below: 
A. Feature Extraction 
The keystroke dynamics extracted from a sequence of ܰ keys 
consist of a vector ܜ which contains the time stamp of every 
key-press (ݐ௣) and key-release (ݐ௥) event. These time stamps 
can be used to model the way a subject types but it is 
necessary to process the data to normalize the features with 
respect to a reference. This normalization on time can be 
achieved considering intervals between consecutive key 
events instead of absolute time stamps, see Fig. 2. The 
recognition systems evaluated in this paper are based on three 
of the most popular keystroke dynamic features:    
• Hold Time: it is the difference between the time of 
pressure and release of the ith key: 
ܪ௜ ൌ ݐ௜௥ െ ݐ௜௣             ݅ ൌ 1, … , ܰ 
• Release-Press latency (RP-latency): is the difference 
between the time of pressure of the (i+1)th key and the 
release of the ith key: 
ܮ௜௥௣ ൌ ݐ௜ାଵ௣ െ ݐ௜௥           ݅ ൌ 1, … , ܰ െ 1 
• Press-Press latency (PP-latency): is the difference 
between the time of pressure of (i+1)th key and the 
pressure of the ith key: 
ܮ௜௣௣ ൌ ݐ௜ାଵ௣ െ ݐ௜௣             ݅ ൌ 1, … , ܰ െ 1 
B. Classifiers (Template Matching) 
The benchmark proposed in this work includes a baseline 
obtained with four keystroke dynamic classification 
algorithms. The algorithms could be used as baseline to 
further research with this dataset. 
Assume ܎ ൌ ሾ ଵ݂, ଶ݂, … , ெ݂ሿ as the feature vector (with ܯ  
features) of a given test sample and 
܏࢑ ൌ ሾ݃ଵ௞, ݃ଶ௞, … , ݃ெ௞ ሿ ׊ ݇ א 1, … ܶ as an enrollment set with ܶ 
samples. The four keystroke dynamics classifiers included in 
the benchmark are: 
• Scaled Manhattan Distance [13]: based on the one 
proposed by Araujo et al. [14]. The distance between a 
feature vector ܎ of the test sample and the enrollment set 
܏ is calculated as: 
݀ଵ ൌ ෍ | ௜݂ െ ҧ݃௜| ܽ௜⁄
ெ
௜ୀଵ
        (1) 
where ܏ത is the average of the enrollment set ܏ത ൌ
భ
೅ ∑ ܏௞௞்ୀଵ   and ܉ is the average absolute deviation of the 
enrollment features, ܉ ൌ భ೅ ∑ ห݃௜௞ െ ҧ݃௜ห  ׊ ݅ א 1, … ܯ௞்ୀଵ . 
• Mahalannobis + Nearest Neighbor: this classifier was 
proposed by Cho et al. [15]. The distance between a test 
sample ܎ and each of the enrollment samples ܏࢑ is 
calculated as: 
Figure 2: Keystroke dynamics features from a digraphs sequence.  
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Figure. 1: Block diagram of a traditional biometric recognition system 
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݀ଶ௞ ൌ ൫܎ െ ܏࢑൯܁ିଵ൫܎ െ ܏࢑൯T           (2) 
where the covariance matrix of the gallery set, ܁, is 
introduced to increase the impact of those features with a 
smaller variance and ሺ·ሻT is the transpose. The final 
distance ݀ଶ is obtained as the minimum in ݇. 
• Combined Manhattan-Mahalannobis distance: this 
distance metric was proposed in [16]. The test samples ܎ 
and the enrollment set ܏ are first normalized as ܎መ ൌ
܁ିଵ ଶ⁄ ܎T and ܏ො ൌ ܁ିଵ ଶ⁄ ܏T, where ܁ is the covariance 
matrix of the enrollment set. The distance ݀ଷ is then 
calculated applying the ܮଵ distance between the 
normalized test sample and the average normalized 
enrollment set: 
݀ଷ ൌ  ฮ܎መ െ ܏ത෠ฮଵ       (3) 
• Modified Scaled Manhattan distance [14]: the distance 
between a feature vector of the test sample ܎ and the 
enrollment set ܏ is calculated as: 
݀ସ ൌ  ෍ | ௜݂ െ ҧ݃௜| σ௜ ᇱ⁄
ெ
௜ୀଵ
        (4) 
where ોᇱ is a modification of the standard deviation: 
  σ௜ᇱ ൌ ቊ
଴.ଶ
ெ ∑ σ௝ெ௝ୀଵ        ݂݅  σ௜ ൏
଴.ଶ
ெ ∑ σ௝ெ௝ୀଵσ௜                           ݎ݁ݏݐ
           (5) 
This simple modification tries to mitigate the effects of 
samples with very low variance during the normalization 
(low variance means high weight).  
The matching score between the test sample and the 
enrollment set is worked out as the inverse of each of the 
distances: ݏ௜ ൌ 1 ݀௜⁄ . 
C. Score Normalization 
It is well-accepted [5-7] that user-dependent thresholds 
(one threshold per user) outperform global thresholds (same 
threshold for all users). The rationale behind this statement is 
that score normalization reduces the misalignment between 
score distributions from different users. There are several 
works in the literature [5-12] analyzing the effectiveness of 
score normalization techniques in behavioral biometrics (e.g. 
voice and signature). The impact of the user is high in 
behavioral biometrics such as keystroke and therefore, it is 
possible that user-dependent score normalization helps to 
improve the verification performance. 
In this work we analyze the performance of different score 
normalization techniques. We can distinguish between two 
different approaches: 
• Normalization a posteriori: the normalization is done 
using statistics from the results obtained during the test 
phase. This normalization allows to explore the limits (in 
terms of performance) of the normalization but it is a 
non-realistic approach. In a real application scenario, the 
scores of the test phase are unknown and not available 
during the training phase. 
• Normalization a priori: the normalization is done using 
statistics obtained exclusively from the enrollment data. 
This is a more realistic methodology in which the 
normalization is tuned according to the information 
available during the enrollment phase.    
The normalization techniques analyzed in this work are 
based in the z-score:   
̂ݏ௜ ൌ
ݏ௜ െ ߤ௜
ߪ௜      ݅ ൌ 1, … , 4 (6) 
where ̂ݏ௜ is the normalized matching score, ݏ௜ are the distances 
obtained with the four classifiers presented in section II.B, ߤ௜ 
and ߪ௜ are the mean and standard deviation of the data used 
during the normalization (ߤ௜ and ߪ௜ are estimated for each 
classifier). In this work we explore three different 
normalization schemes based on the nature of the data used 
[5]:  
• Genuine-Impostor Centric (GIC): in the GIC method it 
is used information from both genuine scores (intra-
person variability) and impostor scores (inter-person 
variability). In this method ߤீூ and ߪீூ are obtained as 
the mean and standard deviation from both genuine and 
impostor scores calculated during the test phase. 
Therefore, this is an a posteriori normalization 
technique.  
• Genuine Centric (GC): in the GC method it is used 
information exclusively from genuine scores of the 
enrollment samples. In this method ߤீ஼ and ߪீ஼  are 
obtained as the mean and standard deviation from 
genuine scores calculated from the available enrolment 
data using the Leave-One-Out methodology. Therefore, 
this is an a priori normalization technique. 
• Genuine-Modified Centric (GMC): the previous GC 
method does not include the impact of the impostor 
scores in the score normalization. The GMC method tries 
to model such an impact by estimating the effects of 
impostor scores in the statistics. It is expected that 
impostor scores show a lower mean and greater standard 
deviation. Therefore the new mean and standard 
deviation are obtained as follows: 
ߤீெ஼ ൌ ߤீ஼ ܴ and    ߪீெ஼ ൌ ܲߪீ஼⁄  (7) 
where ܴ and ܲ are factors to introduce the impact of the 
impostor scores. They are calculated empirically for each 
classifier (one ܴ and ܲ for each classifier). 
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
A. Databases 
This work analyzes two different keystroke recognition 
scenarios: 
• Scenario A – ATVS-Keystroke database [17]: The 
database comprises 63 users with 12 genuine access (two 
sessions with time lapse greater than one day) and 12 
impostor access for each user for a total number of 
samples equal to 1512 (63 users × 24 access). There are 
people from two different nationalities with 60% of 
males and 40% females. The design of the acquisition 
platform is inspired in the traditional web-platforms 
based on application forms (e.g. USA Electronic System 
for Travel Authorization). The idea was to provide a 
familiar environment which allows a natural user 
behavior. The acquisition platform includes 5 forms to 
provide the following personal data: given name, family 
name, email, nationality and national ID number. 
Therefore, in this scenario each user has his/her own 
password (in form of his/her personal data). The 
impostor samples are made by users who try to access 
the system with the information from other users. The 
keystroke dynamics of the users are captured for all 5 
forms. These features include: Hold Time, PP-Latency, 
PR-Latency, RR-Latency and RP-Latency.  
• Scenario B – CMU database [13]:  this dataset 
comprises 51 subjects and 8 sessions with 50 repetitions 
per session. The time lapse between sessions is more 
than one day and the 400 typing samples were collected 
with an accuracy of ±200 microseconds. In this scenario 
the password is the same for all users and it consists of a 
ten characters typical strong password which includes 
uppercase, lowercase and symbols: tie5Roanl. The 
feature data for each sample includes: Hold Time; PP-
Latency; RP-Latency.  
B. Experimental Protocol 
The main aim of the experimental protocol is to establish 
the framework to evaluate the different features (section II.A), 
classifiers (section II.B) and normalization techniques (section 
II.C). Due to the different characteristic of both databases, the 
protocols used present some differences: 
• Experimental protocol for the scenario A: the six feature 
vectors from the first session are used as enrollment set.  
The remaining six feature vectors from the second 
session and the twelve impostor vectors are used as test 
set to calculate the FRR and FAR respectively. Therefore 
we will obtain 6 ൈ 63 ൌ 378 genuine scores and 
12 ൈ 63 ൌ 756 impostor scores. 
• Experimental protocol for the scenario B: the 
methodology used for the CMU database is the same 
proposed in the literature [13] for this dataset.  The first 
four sessions are used as enrollment set while the 
remaining four session are used as test set. As all the 
users share the same password, the first five samples 
from the first session of each user are used as impostor 
set. Therefore we will obtain 400 ൈ 51 ൌ 20,400 
genuine scores and 5 ൈ 51 ൈ 50 ൌ 12,750 impostor 
scores.  
C. Results – Scenario A 
The first experiment is aimed to establish a baseline with 
the performance obtained using the best conditions. These 
conditions include the calculation of the Average Equal Error 
Rate obtained according an optimal threshold per user 
(threshold obtained a posteriori from genuine and impostor 
scores and average EER obtained as mean of the EERs 
obtained for all users). This can be considered as an over 
optimistic performance evaluation but it will be useful to 
establish the performance ceiling. Table 1 shows the 
performance obtained for all four classifiers and different 
features.   
The results suggest that RP-Latency is more discriminant 
than Hold Time but combination (by concatenating the 
features) outperforms individual performances. The rest of 
experiments will be carried out using the combined feature 
scheme. The differences among classifiers is clear and it is 
evident the superior performance of ሼ݀ଵ, ݀ସሽ against ሼ݀ଶ, ݀ଷሽ. The 
best performance is obtained for the Modified Scaled 
Manhattan Distance with an EER equal to 2.22%.  
As was mentioned, using optimized thresholds produces 
over optimistic performances. A common threshold for all 
users is a more suitable approach for real applications. Table 2 
shows the results obtained when a common threshold is used 
for all subjects (all the genuine and impostor scores are 
calculated and the EER is obtained based on a unique 
threshold). The table shows the performance ceiling (from 
Table 1), the performance obtained when the normalization is 
not applied and the performance obtained using the different 
normalization techniques proposed in Section II.C.  
Table 1: Feature performance in terms of Average EER (%) and 
standard deviation (in brackets). Last row includes the performance 
of the combination of RP and HT features. 
݀ଵ ݀ଶ ݀ଷ ݀ସ 
HT 11.0 (0.12) 15.9 (0.13) 13.8 (0.12) 8.87 (0.12) 
RP 7.10 (0.10) 11.9 (0.12) 10.4 (0.12) 4.10 (0.08) 
PP 6.70 (0.10) 11.9 (0.11) 12.1 (0.12) 4.4 (0.08) 
HT+ RP 4.30 (0.07) 9.00 (0.12) 9.60 (0.11) 2.22 (0.06) 
 
Table 2: Score Normalization performance (HT,RP feature 
combination) in terms of EER (%) for ATVS-Keystroke database.. 
Ceiling ݀ଵ ݀ଶ ݀ଷ ݀ସ 
From table 1 4.30  9.00  9.60  2.22 
Normalization ݀ଵ ݀ଶ ݀ଷ ݀ସ 
none 12.0 14.3 16.4 7.3 
GIC (a posteriori) 5.0 10.5 10.0 3.1 
GC (a priori) 10.6 24.2 17.2 7.5 
GMC (a priori) 9.6 15.6 15.6 5.5 
The results show how the performance decreases when a 
unique threshold for all users is applied with EER three times 
greater in some cases (in comparison with the performance 
ceiling obtained in Table 1). These results suggest a large 
misalignment between score distributions from different users. 
However, the normalization techniques mitigate this effect and 
it is possible to achieve competitive performances with GIC 
and GMC normalization. The differences between GC (only 
genuine scores used to calculate the statistics) and GMC 
(genuine statistics modified according the impostor models) 
normalization suggest the great impact of impostor scores in 
the normalization strategies.  
D. Results – Scenario B 
In the case of CMU database, the performance ceiling is 
established according the best feature combination reported in 
the literature with this dataset [13]. Therefore, the feature 
vector is composed by Hold Time, PP Latency and RP-
Latency. The second row of Table 3 reports the performance 
of the Average Equal Error Rate obtained using the optimal 
threshold per user (as in Table 1). The rows 4 to 7 shows the 
performance obtained according the different normalization 
techniques. 
The results suggest that scores distribution from CMU 
dataset are more aligned than those from ATVS-Keystroke 
database. This can be observed comparing the moderate 
degradation of the performance when we use a unique 
threshold without normalization (fourth row) instead of 
optimized thresholds (second row). While ATVS-Keystroke 
database showed degradation up to 300%, the degradation on 
CMU database is around 40%. The reason of this alignment 
can be explained because all users in CMU share the same 
password while users in ATVS-Keystroke database have 
specific passwords per subject. However, for some classifiers 
(e.g. Modified Scaled Manhattan distance) the normalization 
clearly improves the performances (see Fig. 3).     
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analyzed different score normalization 
techniques for keystroke biometric authentication. The 
experiments include two different databases and four state-of-
the-art keystroke dynamics classifiers. The results suggest that 
score normalization can be used to improve the performance 
of keystroke authentication systems. The improvement varies 
depending of the dataset and the classifier but there is still 
room for research and the results obtained encourage to further 
investigate. Future work will include larger dataset, supervised 
machine learning algorithms (e. g.  SVMs or NN) and score 
calibration techniques. 
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Figure 3: ROC curves for different normalization strategies using the Modified Scaled Manhattan Distance and ATVS-Keystroke database (on the left) and
CMU database (on the right).   
Table 3: Score Normalization performance in terms of EER (%) for 
CMU dataset. 
Ceiling ݀ଵ ݀ଶ ݀ଷ ݀ସ 
HT+PP+RP 8.6 8.9 8.2 8.8 
Normalization ݀ଵ ݀ଶ ݀ଷ ݀ସ 
none 10.3 9.6 9.9 12.6 
GIC (a posteriori) 8.6 9.0 7.9 8.9 
GC (a priori) 10.7 11.5 10.0 11.7 
GMC (a priori) 10.2 10.5 9.8 10.7 
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